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In this paper we study some aspects of the question of international environmental
regulation from a game theoretic perspective.  We address two broad questions.  First, we
examine the circumstances under which the pursuit of unilateral environmental policy by a
country in a Stackelberg game, will make that country worse off.   Second, we study the effects
of environmental regulation by means of alternate price control instruments in a Stackelberg
game where there is transboundary pollution. 
We find that there are plausible theoretical circumstances in which the pursuit of unilateral
environmental policy is not a good idea.  Further, we show that in choosing between alternate
pollution control instruments, national governments typically face a tradeoff between instruments
which correct more distortions but are costly to implement and instruments which correct fewer
distortions but are less costly to implement.  In particular, we obtain a dominance result for a
tariff policy; this result favors the use of tariffs from an informational standpoint alone. 
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1.  Introduction
In recent times, issues relating to the use and misuse of the environment have come to
dominate debate in the public policy arena in most countries.  International events such as the
Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro have only served to heighten public consciousness about the role
of various nations in protecting the global environment.  As a result, the myriad activities
associated with the regulation of environmental externalities have come to attain greater
significance than ever before.
In this paper, we study some aspects of the question of international environmental
regulation from a game theoretic perspective.  We address two broad questions.   The first
question concerns an examination of the conditions under which environmental policy, pursued
unilaterally by a country in a Stackelberg game, will make that country worse off.   Second, we
study the effects of regulating environmental pollution via alternate means in a Stackelberg game
when there is transboundary pollution.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.   In section 2, a detailed review is provided
of the pertinent literature relating to the questions addressed in this paper.  In section 3, the effects
of unilateral environmental policy are discussed in a strategic context.  In section 4, the analysis
of section 3 is generalized to include the case of transboundary pollution.  A natural question in
such a context where one is concerned about the welfare effects of pollution control policy is the
“choice of instrument” issue.  The implications of controlling pollution in this setting are studied2
by means of alternate price instruments.  The three price instruments which we consider are an
import tariff (a trade policy instrument), a production tax (a domestic policy instrument) and a
combination of the two instruments.  Finally, in section 5, the salient findings are summarized.
2.  International Pollution Regulation:  A Synopsis of Findings
Previous researchers have studied questions related to ours.  On the empirical front, in an
early paper D'Arge and Kneese (1972) left the question of the effects of unilateral environmental
controls open by demonstrating positive income effects for all countries being studied irrespective
of whether environmental controls were instituted unilaterally or multilaterally.  In another
empirical study, Walter (1973, p. 68) came to the tentative conclusion that “. . . U.S. trade
[would] be affected if the world's nations [adopted] different environmental standards and/or
ways of implementing such standards.”  In a rather comprehensive empirical study of the effects
of unilateral environmental controls in primarily the USA manufacturing sector, Leonard (1984)
found little support for the industrial flight hypothesis.  Similarly, Tobey (1990) has shown that
the adoption of stringent environmental controls does not per se weaken a nation's comparative
advantage in trade.  On the other hand, Whalley (1991, p. 188) has argued that if “. . . indeed
global policy responses to [environmental concerns such as] global warming are enacted, the
consequences for . . . patterns of trade between regions, is likely to be severe.”  As this brief
review of the empirical literature shows, a consensus on the empirical effects of environmental
controls is yet to be achieved. 
The theoretical literature is more uniform in its findings.  Pethig (1976) and Asako (1979)
have both shown that under certain conditions, when a nation's pollution intensive good is3
Here, producer refers to the producer of the polluting good.
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exported, increased trade can diminish that country's welfare.  Siebert, Eichberger, Gronych, and
Pethig (1980) have examined the relationship between environmental quality, environmental
policy, and international trade in a two-country world in some detail.  Inter alia, in a nonstrategic
context, these authors have identified conditions for an increase in resource use in pollution
abatement and a fall in national income in the pollution controlling country.  In a somewhat
different vein, McGuire (1982) has shown that in an open economy with factor mobility across
countries, unilateral environmental regulation can drive the regulating country out of producing
the regulated good. 
Batabyal (1991) has studied the conditions under which environmental policy, pursued
unilaterally by a large country will make that country worse off.  Batabyal (1994) shows how a
large developing country which is precluded from using its market power in trade can use its
domestic tax structure optimally to attain environmental and trade policy objectives. 
These two papers contain results regarding three variables of interest.  First, it is shown
that in a scenario with pollution, the terms of trade after taxation improve if and only if the
marginal propensity to consume the polluting good in the taxing country exceeds the elasticity
of supply of the same good.  An implication of this result is that if the reverse condition holds,
in a terms of trade sense, the taxing country can be worse off. 
The second result concerns the post tax producer  price ratio in the taxing country.  The
2
expected result that the post tax producer price ratio in the taxing country should decline holds
only if the taxing country's post tax terms of trade improve.  If this last condition does not hold,4
it is possible to obtain the perverse result in which the polluting good producers in the taxing
country actually increase production owing to a rise in the price ratio faced by them! 
The final result concerns the effect of the pollution tax on “environmentally adjusted”
national income in the taxing country.  The effect here is generally ambiguous.  Collectively, the
clear message of these findings is that plausible theoretical circumstances exist in which the
unilateral conduct of environmental policy by a large country—in a nonstrategic context—can
make that country worse off. 
Felder and Rutherford (1993) have shown how unilateral actions taken by OECD
countries can fail to reduce global CO  emissions to desirable levels because of free riding by 2 
nonparticipating nations.  However, Hoel (1993) has argued that the harmonization of domestic
carbon taxes in international climate agreements is not a good idea.  He has suggested that an
international carbon tax be used for the purpose of addressing problems such as global warming.
With regard to the question of pollution control (domestic and transboundary) in an
imperfectly competitive economy, we note that general equilibrium or partial equilibrium models
of trade with pollution are only beginning to be developed in a systematic fashion.  In addition
to the papers already cited, Markusen (1975a) has derived optimal taxes for pollution control
when the incidence of pollution is international.  His analysis, however, is conducted in a static
competitive framework and hence does not address the important issues of imperfect competition,
retaliation, and dynamics.  In another paper, this time in an imperfectly competitive trade setting
with an international externality, Markusen (1975b) has shown that the noncooperative Cournot
outcome is not Pareto optimal.  By comparing the noncooperative equilibrium and cooperative
equilibrium, he has also shown that the cooperative imposition of national production taxes will5
not in general lead to a Pareto efficient outcome unless accompanied by transfer payments.
Markusen, Morey, and Olewiler (1993) have studied the effects of environmental policy in a
scenario with imperfect competition arising from increasing returns to scale.  They show that
pollution control policies can cause firms to close plants and/or shift production from one country
to another.  Hoel (1992) has analyzed a differential game model of global CO  emissions.  He 2 
shows that although the Markov perfect equilibrium without taxes involves higher CO  emissions 2 
as compared to the open loop equilibrium without taxes, there exists a time path of CO  taxes 2 
which gives rise to the socially optimal rate of emissions in both the open loop and the Markov
perfect equilibria. 
In a paper that is rather similar to the present one in its motivation, Merrifield (1988) has
studied the question of transboundary pollution control within the context of the USA-Canada
acid deposition issue.  Merrifield's analysis is static and conducted within a competitive
framework.  As a result, his analysis fails to take into account the strategic aspects of the
USA-Canada acid deposition issue.  Dockner and Long (1993) have studied the transboundary
pollution control problem by formulating the problem as a differential game between two
countries.  They show that under certain circumstances cooperative pollution control policies can
be supported without recourse to retaliation.  However, they caution against excessive euphoria
regarding this result because the number of assumptions needed to obtain this result is likely to
diminish the practical relevance of the result.  Rauscher (1991) has analyzed the relationship
between international trade and environmental quality.  He has shown that when environmental
pollution is included in a trade model and a nation moves in the direction of free trade, the
concomitant gains from trade are not necessarily positive anymore.  Further, plausible6
circumstances exist in which a nation can actually improve its environmental quality by lowering
its pollution emission tax.  Conrad (1993) has constructed a model of international oligopoly and
has shown how domestic welfare can be improved by governments.  Such an improvement can
be brought about by granting subsidies for pollution abatement efforts and/or for the use of
polluting inputs. 
Finally, the choice of alternate price instruments issue has been little studied.  Very
recently, a small number of researchers have begun to address this question theoretically and
empirically.  Ulph (1992) has shown that when international trade is modeled as a Stackelberg
game and when both the producing countries have sufficiently small shares of world production,
both countries do better when pollution is controlled by means of a standard by the follower.
When trade is modeled as a Cournot game, once again the choice of standards by both countries
dominates the choice of taxes.  Conrad and Schroder (1991) have studied the resource costs of
attaining a given level of environmental quality by means of emission standards, subsidies and
emission taxes in an applied general equilibrium model.  They have shown that the use of an
emission tax involves the lowest resource cost, followed by subsidies and emission standards. 
We now move onto the main analysis of this paper.  In section 3 we examine the outcome
of unilateral environmental policy in a Stackelberg game in which policy retaliation is allowed.
In section 4, we generalize the game theoretic analysis of section 3 to the case where there is
transboundary pollution. 7
3.  The Imperfect Competition Model
3a.  Preliminaries
There are two countries—A and B.  In each country there is a government which chooses
a tax to control pollution, a firm which produces a good for domestic and foreign consumption,
and consumers who are affected by pollution differently and who buy on the domestic market
from the A firm or the B firm.  Further, there is a single good where production causes pollution
in both countries.  This good is denoted by q with the appropriate superscripts.  The total quantity
of the good in A is denoted by Q  = q  + q  where q  and q  denote the quantity produced
A AH BX AH BX
by the A firm for home consumption and the quantity produced by the B firm for foreign
consumption.  We denote the pollution taxes by t  and t , respectively.  Note that the two
A  B 
countries are identical on the production side.  The only difference between them arises from the
fact that the constant marginal social disutilities of pollution in A and B are not necessarily equal.
In this paper we shall work with linear functional forms.  However, even with the
imposition of this additional structure, unambiguous results will, in general, not be forthcoming.
Most of our results are in the form of inequalities.  In certain cases, these inequalities can be
easily understood, in other cases, the relevant inequalities are harder to interpret.
Recall that the A government levies a pollution tax on the production of the polluting
good.  We allow the B government to retaliate.  Why does B retaliate? B retaliates due to two
reasons.  The first reason has to do with the fact that although there is pollution in B and B would
like to control pollution, B is reluctant to undertake measures to do so unilaterally.  A's actions
give B a rationale for pollution prevention.  Second, B retaliates because B fears that by allowing8
Batabyal (1991, 1994) has shown that in some circumstances, these concerns are legitimate.
3
A more general specification for inverse demand would involve letting P (Q ) = a - b Q , and
4 A  A  A  A 
P (Q ) = a - b Q .  For the purpose of analytical convenience, we have set b  = b  = 1.
B  B  B  B  A B
A's actions to go unchallenged, B will be worse off owing to the perceived shift in the terms of
trade in A's favor subsequent to the imposition of a pollution tax by A.   Note though that because
3
the game being analyzed is a Stackelberg game, there is a clear asymmetry in the positions of A
and B.  A takes B's reaction as given whereas B takes A's action as given.  Our goal is to
characterize the optimal taxes and to explore the implications of such taxes in the equilibrium of
a Stackelberg game. 
3b.  The Effects of a Pollution Tax
The total quantity of the good in A is Q  = q  + q  where q  is the quantity produced
A AH BX AH
by the A firm for home consumption and q  is the quantity produced by the B firm for foreign
BX
consumption.  Similarly, in B the total quantity on the market is Q  = q  + q .  The inverse
B BH AX
demand function in A is given by P (Q ) = a - Q .  The inverse demand function in B is
A A A
P (Q ) = a - Q .  We can think of the intercept term “a” as the saturation level of demand in each
B B B
country.  That is, as the price approaches zero, the demand for the good approaches a.   The A
4
and B firms have two kinds of costs; the cost of manufacturing the good and the cost associated
with tax payment.  The first cost for the A firm is given by C (q , q ) = c(q  + q ) where c
A AH AX AH AX
is the constant marginal cost.  The second cost for the A firm is given by t (q  + q ).  This
A AH AX
second cost is what the government in A collects as tax revenues.  The revenues are transferred
to consumers in A in a lump sum manner so that the income distribution of consumers in A
remains unaltered.  Similarly, the B firm has two costs given by C (q  , q ) = c(q  + q ) and
B BH BX BH BXmaxqAH , qAX








When the inverse demand function is P (Q ) = a - Q , it is easily established that aggregate consumer
5 A  A  A 
surplus is given by (1/2)(Q ) . 
A 2 
t (q  + q ), respectively.  The social welfare functions in A and B are given by
B BH BX
W (t , q , q ) = (1/2)(Q )  +  ( ) + t (q  + q ) - v (q  + q ) and
A A AH AX A 2 A A AH AX A AH AX
W (t , q , q ) = (1/2)(Q )  +  ( ) + t (q  + q ) - v (q  + q ), respectively, where  ( ) and
B B BH BX B 2 B B BH BX B BH BX A
( ) are the profit functions of each firm, and v ( ) and v ( ) are the national disutility from
B A B
pollution functions.  Thus, social welfare is the sum of consumer surplus,  firm profits, tax
5
revenues, and the disutility from pollution, all measured in dollar terms. 
The timing of the Stackelberg game is as follows.  First, the governments in A and B
choose t  and t , respectively.  Next, the A firm (the leader) chooses its quantities in the two
A  B 
markets taking as given the B firm's (the follower's) reaction.  The B firm takes the A firm's
action as given.  Finally, the players receive their payoffs which are profits (  and  ) for the
A  B 
two firms and social welfare (W  and W ) for the two governments.  To find the Stackelberg
A  B 
equilibrium, we proceed in a manner analogous to the backwards induction method of solving
extensive form games of the type being analyzed here (see Kreps, 1989, pp. 421-25). 
Suppose that the two governments have chosen t  and t .  Then, if the 4-tuple (q , q ,
A  B  AH  AX 
* *
q , q ) is a Nash equilibrium in the remaining game between the A firm and the B firm, it * *
BH  BX 
must be true that (q , q ) solves * *
AH  AX 
(1a)
and that (q , q ) solves * *
BH  BX 
(1b)q
BH (1/2)(a c q
AX t B)
q
BX (1/2)(a c q
AH t B) .
q
AH (1/2)(a c t B 2t A) ,
q
AX (1/2)(a c t B 2t A) ,
q
BH (1/4)(a c 2t A 3t B) ,
q
BX (1/4)(a c 2t A 3t B) .











A (1/14)(3c 3a t B 16v A)
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Now  ( ) can be written as the sum of the A firm's profits on the two markets in which it sells
A
its product.  That is,   =   +  .  Thus, we can write the A firm's original optimization
A AH AX 
problem as a pair of optimization problems. 
Similarly, we note that   =   +  .  Letting q  and q  be the solutions to the two
B BH BX  BH  BX 
* *









Note that q  = q  and that q  = q .  Having solved the second-stage game between the two * * * *
AH AX BH BX
firms, we can now solve the first-stage game between the two governments.  The A government
solves 
(4a)
and the B government solves
(4b)
Solving (4a) and (4b) we get as our solutions 
(5a)
andt
B (1/11)(7c 7a 6t A 24v B) .
q
AH q
AX (1/154)(61a 61c 42t A 11t B 176v A 168v B)
q
BH q
BX (1/308)(191a 191c 126t A 11t B 176v A 504v B) .
a 2 4at B 8at A 6ct B 8ct A 8t At B 4(t B)2 8(t A)2 2c 2 .
2t A t B 0 .
4at A 6at B 5ct A 8ct B 4(t A)2 12t At B 9(t B)2 0 .
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(5b)
Equations (5a) and (5b) give us the equilibrium taxes in the Stackelberg game.  Note that t    t . * *
A B
The underlying strategic aspect of this Stackelberg game is captured by the interdependent
equilibrium taxes of each government.  In the sense of Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer
(1985), each firm treats the output of its competing firm as a “strategic substitute.”  Using the tax
expressions given by (5a) and (5b), the equilibrium outcome of this pollution tax game is given
by 
and
We can now compare the posttax equilibrium with the status quo equilibrium, i.e., the
equilibrium with no policy intervention.  In A, consumer surplus with the tax   consumer surplus
without a tax iff {t  + 2t }   0.  Similarly, the posttax profits of the A firm   the pretax profits
B A
iff    In B, consumer
surplus with the tax   consumer surplus without the tax as    Profits for the B
firm with the tax   profits without the tax as
  First, we note that the posttax
consumer surplus in A and B almost certainly declines.  The intuition for this result lies in
recognizing that for the linear demand function that we have been using, consumer surplus is
monotonically increasing in total market output; this output almost certainly declines with the
imposition of the tax.  Second, the effect of the tax on profits in A and B is ambiguous.  The key
variables here would appear to be the magnitude of t  and t .  Third, from (3a) to (3d), we see
A  B 12
that the marginal impact on the A firm's output resulting from an increase in the A tax is less than
the marginal impact on the B firm's output resulting from a similar increase in the B tax.  This is
what one would expect from the fact that the order of moves in the second stage of this game is
sequential rather than simultaneous. 
We conclude this section by noting that the unilateral pursuit of environmental policy is
not necessarily a desirable goal for A.  The same can be said of B (the following country) as well.
Consumers will, most likely, lose with the conduct of unilateral environmental policy.  Further,
the post policy A and B firm profits may also be lower.  We now analyze the case of
transboundary pollution in a Stackelberg game. 
4.  The Imperfect Competition Model With Transboundary Pollution
4a.  Preliminaries
In this section we analyze the efficacy of alternate pollution control instruments when
there is transboundary pollution.  The two governments in A and B are restricted to choosing
between a domestic policy instrument (a production tax), a trade policy instrument (an import
tariff), and a combination of these two instruments (the joint policy instrument).  Since the
underlying issues are now fairly involved, before studying the implications of the three policy
regimes, we first discuss the issues intuitively. 
The first issue concerns world welfare.  When there are a number of distortions present
in the world economy (these are discussed below) and national governments attempt to correct
for these distortions by means of the instruments mentioned above in a noncooperative game, the
ensuing equilibria are typically optimal in a myopic sense.  That is, while individual country13
See Batabyal (1993) for a discussion of this and related issues.
6
Clearly, the actual answer depends on the elasticities of the relevant functions.
7
welfare is maximized by the respective governments, world welfare need not be.  This stems from
the noncooperative nature of the underlying game being played by the parties concerned.  In
some sense, the “correct” taxes and tariffs are those which arise from coordinated play by the
respective governments.  Practically, this involves coordination of environmental policy by all
the players involved.  This is something that is not only fairly well understood by economists but
also something that one typically does not observe for a variety of well-known reasons.   It is
6
worth noting that all of our subsequent results are myopic in the sense of this discussion. 
In determining which policy instrument to adopt, the government of each country will
attempt to weigh the effects of a particular policy on the three underlying distortions that are
present in our two-country world.  First, there is the pollution distortion.  A production tax will
reduce pollution by reducing the output of the good which causes pollution.  However, this only
reduces domestic pollution but does not do anything to reduce foreign pollution.  An import tariff,
on the other hand, reduces foreign pollution by making the posttariff purchase of the foreign good
undesirable and by increasing the costs of foreign producers.  However, since the amount of
pollution that is reduced by means of a tariff is probably less than the amount of pollution
reduced by means of a production tax, as far as the pollution distortion is concerned, an optimally
calculated production tax is likely to be the superior policy instrument of the two considered so
far.   The joint policy instrument would curb both domestic and foreign pollution.  Therefore, as
7
far as the pollution distortion alone is concerned, of the three instruments under consideration,
ex ante, this instrument would appear to be the best means of pollution control. 14
The second distortion concerns the domestic share of total output.  In general, the
monopolistic firm in each country will not sell the “correct” amount in the home market.  In
determining which policy instrument to adopt, the two governments would presumably like to
increase the domestic market share of total good production and hence reduce imports.  By
discouraging the purchase of the foreign good, an import tariff would certainly increase the
domestic market share of total output.  A production tax on the other hand would not achieve this
goal since a production tax would unambiguously curtail all domestic production.  The joint
policy instrument can be expected to result in total domestic output which is bounded below by
the tax output and above by the tariff output.  Thus, as far as this distortion is concerned, ex ante,
a tariff would appear to be the best policy instrument.
The third distortion concerns monopoly rents.  The second stage game in this model is a
game between two monopolists earning supra normal economic rent.  The government in each
country would presumably like to capture some of this rent.  By collecting some of the revenue
which otherwise would have gone to the foreign monopolist, each government can capture some
of this monopoly rent by means of an import tariff.  An appropriately set production tax can also
transfer some of the surplus collected by the home monopolistic firm to the government setting
the tax.  The joint policy instrument can also be expected to have the same qualitative impact as
a tariff or a tax except that its quantitative impact will certainly be different.  Thus, as far as this
distortion is concerned, all three policy instruments can work in the right direction.  We see that,
in general, the properties of the three instruments are likely to be quite different.  We now
formally analyze the related questions of the effects of environmental policy and the choice of
policy instrument issue in a Stackelberg game. q
BH argmaxq BH q BH a q BH q
AX c
q
BX argmaxq BX q BX a q BX q
AH c r A
q
BH (1/2)(a c q
AX)
q
BX (1/2)(a c q
AH r A) .
q
AH (1/2)(a c r A) ,
q
AX (1/2)(a c 2r B) ,
q
BH (1/4)(a c 2r B) ,
q
BX (1/4)(a c 3r A) .







4b.  The Control of Transboundary Pollution
We first study the import tariff case.  In the Stackelberg tariff game, the second stage is
characterized by sequential moves, first by the A firm (the leader) and then the B firm (the
follower).  The notation used here is the same as in section 3 except the tariffs levied by the two
countries are now denoted by r  and r , respectively.  Writing B firm’s profit-maximization
A  B 
problem as the sum of two separate profit-maximization problems and letting
and









Equations (7a) through (7d) tell us the equilibrium quantities which will be produced by
the A firm and the B firm in the home and in the export markets. 
In the first stage of the two-stage game, the A and B governments solve 
(8a)






r A (1/19)(5a 5c 8v A 12v B)
r B (1/10)(a c 8v A 2v B) .
q
AH (1/58)(29a 29c 16v A 24v B) ,
q
AX (1/10)(4a 4c 8v A 2v B) ,
q
BH (1/10)(3a 3c 4v A v B) ,
q
BX (1/19)(a c 6v A 9v B) ,
{a 2 c 2} {3ar A 2(r A)2 2ar B 2cr B 3cr A 6r Ar B 4(r B)2} .
16
(8b)




The important aspect of the above solutions is that (9a) is independent of r  and (9b) is
B 
independent of r .  In other words, choosing tariffs given by (9a) and (9b) constitutes dominant
A 
strategies for the A and B governments.  This is a rather strong finding; it tells us that irrespective
of what one country is doing, it is always in the interest of the second country to set a tariff given
by (9a) or (9b).  This dominance result is due to:  (a) the asymmetric incidence of tariffs in the
relevant objective functions (compare (8a) with (11a) for instance), and (b) our use of linear
functional forms.  In more complicated models, this dominance result may or may not hold.
Using (9a) and (9b), the four equilibrium quantities can be computed.  The equilibrium outcome




(9a), and (9b). 
We can now compare the posttariff outcome with the status quo outcome in the two
countries.  In country A, the status quo consumer surplus   the post tariff consumer surplus as
0   r .  The A firm's status quo profits   its profits with the tariff as
A 0 {4ar B 4cr B 6ar A 6cr A 9(r A)2} .
q
BH (1/2)(a c q
AX t B) q
BX (1/2)(a c q
AH t B) .
q
AH q
AX (1/2)(a c t B 2t A) ,
q
BH q
BX (1/4)(a c 2t A 3t B) .














t A (1/14)(3c 3a t B 16v A 8v B)
t B (1/11)(7c 7a 6t A 16v A 24v B) .
17
In country B, the status quo consumer surplus   the post tariff consumer surplus as 0   r  and the
B
status quo profits for the B firm   its profits with the tariff as
Recall that for the linear inverse demand function, consumer surplus is monotonically increasing
in Q  and Q , respectively.  Thus, the posttariff consumer surplus in both nations declines as
A  B 
long as the two tariffs are positive.  The effect of the tariff on firm profits is ambiguous. 
Moving onto the Stackelberg tax game, the B firm's reaction functions are
and  Using these two




The A government solves 
(11a)
and the B government solves 
(11b)
Making the usual simplifications, simplifying the maximands, and differentiating (11a) and (11b)
with respect to t  and t , respectively, we get 





AX (1/154)(61a 61c 42t A 288v A 11t B 256v B) ,
q
BH q
BX (1/308)(191a 191c 11t B 512v A 592v B 126t A) ,
{4ct A 4at A 20(t A)2 (t B)2 2at B 2ct B 4t A t B} 0 .
{4at A 6at B 4ct A 6ct B 12t A t B 9(t B)2 4(t A)2} 0
q
AH (1/2)(a c r A t B 2t A) ,
q
AX (1/2)(a c t B 2r B 2t A) ,
q
BH (1/4)(a c 3t B 2r B 2t A) ,
q
BX (1/4)(a c 3r A 3t B 2t A) .
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We see that, as contrasted to the tariff game, the choice of taxes in this game does not constitute
a dominant strategy for either government.  We shall have more to say about this when we
discuss the merits of controlling pollution via the three instruments under consideration.  For the
moment, we note that the equilibrium outcome of this tax game is given by
(12a), and (12b). 
Performing the usual comparative exercise, we see that the status quo consumer surplus
in A   the post tax consumer surplus iff 0   {t  + 2t } holds.  The A firm's posttax profits   the
B  A 
status quo profits iff 
In country B, the status quo consumer surplus   the posttax consumer surplus iff 0   {t  + 2t }
B  A 
holds and the B firm's posttax profits   its status quo profits as
holds. 
We now analyze the equilibrium tariffs and taxes when the A and B governments use a





(13d)maxr A ,t A (1/2)(Q
A)













maxr B ,t B (1/2)(Q
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r A (1/19)(a c 7t B 26t A 8v A 12v B) ,
t A (1/16)(13a 13c 13r A t B 8r B 16v A 8v B) ,
r B (1/10)(3a 3c 3t B 14t A 8v A 4v B) ,
t B (1/11)(7c 7a 6r B 6t A 6r A 16v A 24v B) .
q
AH (1/3344)(2021c 2021a 825t B 1376t A 208v A 6376v B 2584r B 1805r A) ,
q
AX (1/880)(819c 819a 475t A 319t B 680r B 464v A 1048v B 1322t A) ,
q
BH (1/1760)(2259a 2259c 1160r B 1952t A 5r A 1744v A 2968v B 319t B) ,
q
BX (1/6688)(7317a 7317c 19r A 2057t B 4408r B 6064v A 15784v B 2736t A)
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The A government solves 
(14a)
and the B government solves 
(14b)





Using (15a) through (15d) we can determine the four equilibrium quantities.  They are 
and 
This completes the determination of the equilibrium tariffs, taxes, and quantities. 
We first compare the outcome of the tariff game with the outcome of the tax game for
country A.  Algebra reveals that consumer surplus with a tariff   consumer surplus with a tax iff
r    {t + 2t } holds.  The A firm profits in the tax game   its profits in the tariff game if and
A B  A 
only if {a 2 c 2 8at A 8ct A 40(t A)2 2(t B)2 4at B 4ct B 8t At b}
{3ar A 2(r 4)2 2ar B 2cr B 3cr A 6r Ar B 4(r B)2}
12at B 8ct A 12ct B 24t At B 18(t B)2 8(t A)2} {4ar B 4cr B 6ar A 6cr A 9(r
20
holds.  Similarly in country B, consumer surplus in the tariff game   the consumer surplus in the
tax game as 2r  {2t + t }.  The B firm's profits in the tax game   the profits in the tariff game
B  A  B
as
Clearly, the conditions determining the effect of the tariff and the tax on firm profits are difficult
to interpret intuitively.  However, the results are understood by recalling that consumer surplus
is monotonic in total output. 
With regard to the efficacy of the joint policy instrument, we note that consumer surplus
in A with the joint policy   the status quo consumer surplus iff {r + t + 2t }   0.  Further,
A  B  A 
compared to the other two policies, the joint policy A consumer surplus   the consumer surplus
with the tariff only policy iff {r + t + 2t }  {r }  and   the consumer surplus with
A  B  A  Joint Policy  A  Tariff 
the tax-only policy as {r + t + 2t }  {t + 2t } .  On the other hand, in country B the
A  B  A  Joint Policy  B  A  Tax 
joint policy consumer surplus   the status quo consumer surplus iff {t + 2r + 2t }   0, and the
B  B  A 
joint policy consumer surplus   the tariff only policy as {2r + t + 2t }  {2r } .
B  B  A  Joint Policy  B  Tariff 
Finally, the joint policy consumer surplus   the tax only policy as {t + 2r + 2t }
B  B  A  Joint
 {2t + t } . 
Policy  A  B  Tax 
An initial examination of the above results suggests that the choice of instrument issue is
hopelessly tangled.  However, a few useful insights can still be gained.  First, notice that the
choice of tariffs given by (9a) and (9b) constitute dominant strategies for the two governments.
Such is not the case as far as the equilibrium taxes or the equilibrium joint policy instruments are
concerned.  This biases the choice issue in favor of tariffs in the sense that pollution control can21
now be achieved by A, for instance, independent of what B does.  Practically, this substantially
reduces the informational requirements of pollution control.  As long as a government knows the
parameters of the various relevant functions in its own country, it can set an optimal tariff.  There
is no need to know or guess the second country's actions.  With a production tax or with the joint
policy instrument, the informational requirements are greater.
Second, when the instrument choice question is restricted to one between the tariff and
the tax, we see that consumers in A are indifferent between the two means of pollution control
when   r = t + 2t .  At this point of indifference, assuming that t > 0, the magnitude of the tariff
A  B  A  B 
in A exceeds the magnitude of the tax in A and the tax in B.  We can expect the A firm to lobby
the A government for a tariff against the B firm rather than be subjected to a tax.  The B firm, on
the other hand, would prefer a tax in A rather than have q  subjected to a tariff.  The
BX 
government in A will prefer the tariff to the production tax iff social welfare with the tariff
exceeds social welfare with the tax.  When r < t + 2t , consumers are worse off with a tariff
A  B  A 
than they are with a tax.  Simple algebra tells us that the tariff which makes consumers worse off
is bigger than the tariff which makes consumers indifferent between the tariff policy and the tax
policy.  Similarly, it is easily seen that the magnitude of the tax which makes consumers worse
off is bigger than the magnitude of the tax which makes consumers indifferent between a tariff
policy and a tax policy.  Analogous results hold for country B as well. 
Of the three instruments under consideration, the informational requirements of the joint
policy instrument are the greatest.  For instance, from (15a) through (15d), we see that in order
to set r  and t  optimally, the B government must know both t  and r  and t , respectively.
B  B  A  A  A 
While the joint policy instrument is probably the most desirable in terms of correcting the22
different distortions alluded to in section 4a, its implementation, given its informational
requirements, is likely to be very costly.  This completes our discussion of the instrument choice
question.
5.  Conclusions
In this paper we have studied a number of important issues concerning optimal
environmental regulation in an open economy from a game theoretic perspective.  Before we
summarize our principal findings, a few brief comments about the models used. 
First, the models can be used to study the environmental policy formation process between
trading entities such as the USA and EEC.  In this case, assuming that the USA behaves as a
Stackelberg leader, substitute USA for A and EEC for B.  Alternatively, these models can be used
to study why the policy response in large developing countries (LDCs), such as Brazil and India
to environmental externalities is slow if not altogether nonexistent.  In this case, one possibility
would be to substitute LDC for A.  With suitable alterations, other applications come to mind.
Second, the model can be made richer by making it truly dynamic and by explicitly
incorporating uncertainty into the decision-making process.  Alternatively, one may attempt to
formulate a game with certain desired properties.  This is a problem in mechanism design. 
To recapitulate, after reviewing some of the previous research in this area, we explored
the desirability of implementing environmental policy unilaterally in a strategic setting.  In a
Stackelberg game, we showed that there exist theoretical circumstances in which going it alone
is not a good idea for the leading country.  Further, the results are less than sanguine for the
following country as well. 23
We then studied a Stackelberg game model of transboundary pollution.  We considered
in considerable detail, the important issue of prices versus prices, i.e., the merits of pollution
control by means of an import tariff (a trade policy instrument), a production tax (a domestic
policy instrument), and a joint policy instrument.  Recognizing the impossibility of resolving the
choice issue without considerable additional structure, we identified several conditions, in the
form of inequalities, which determine whether consumers and producers are likely to gain or lose
from the pursuit of a specific policy.  A basic issue faced by the two governments concerned the
tradeoff between policy efficacy on the one hand and the cost of policy implementation on the
other.  Indeed, as George Moore once said, “The difficulty in life is the choice.” 24
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